Jamie Palumbo and Samuel Birnbaum
St. Mary's College of Maryland
THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY SECURITY REGIME
Energy security in both the US and the EU currently faces serious risks. Europe, in particular, is almost completely dependent on external energy sources, most of which originate or are transported through Russia. In view of Russia's increasing willingness to use hard power in defense of its energy monopoly (as demonstrated by the recent conflict in Georgia) this arrangement is untenable. Foreign energy dependence also gives rise to myriad security concerns that cannot be mitigated through unilateral action or US energy independence. Given this reality, the only option for rebuilding energy security is multilateral action. Although the IEA has proved itself useful for establishing basic norms and enacting emergency relief measures, it lacks the broad membership and enforcement mechanisms necessary to provide legitimate energy security. A modified and reinforced IEA, however, that includes the US, EU, and Caucasus and Central Asian energy states could act as a counterweight against Russia's dominance of the gas market. This new organization would constitute a binding security alliance, otherwise known as an 'energy security regime,' and would promote interdependence, equality, conservation, and security.
Energy and energy security are increasingly important to US national security.
According to the US Department of Energy and The Washington Post, the US imported approximately 60% of its oil in 2007, a figure which is projected to increase to 68% by 2025. This dependence on fossil fuels and on the countries that supply them is cause for significant concern. Some have argued that our basic morals are incompatible with those of many oil producing states, others that energy deals with these states place our basic security interests in harm's way. Both these criticisms have gained new traction because of Russia's recent aggressiveness in establishing its energy monopoly, and are forcing the US government to reconsider the most basic tenets of its energy policies. What will the United States' response be to the recent deterioration of the international energy climate? What are US priorities with regards to dealing with energy producing nations?
This paper demonstrates that the US's basic energy security structure currently faces significant threats. Countries such as Russia that possess large energy endowments exert disproportionate influences on their 'customers' and pose a substantial threat to international stability, both in terms of energy availability itself and international influence overall. Research has shown that oil and gas monopolies allow their possessors to disregard international law. These countries can and do manipulate energy relations to further their personal goals across varied political arenas. This threat is magnified by the fact that the US is unable to singularly produce enough energy to support its needs. While it does not appear that the US will be able to switch over entirely to renewable energy sources in the near future, it is not in the best interest of the US to perpetuate a relationship with countries in which the US is always at a distinct disadvantage.
Given the realities of globalization, the US will not be able to resolve this problem unilaterally. Even if energy independence were possible, energy crises in other states will invariably lead to negative consequences for the US through trade and the global economy. We contend that energy security is an international public good that cannot be provided by a single hegemon. We therefore put forward a proposal based on the idea of collective action with the objective of restoring US energy security. We propose to create an organization that takes elements of a traditional international organization, along with the security of a binding alliance. This 'energy security regime' will ensure access to supplies, provide collective bargaining power against energy producing states, and enhance the security around existing and future energy infrastructures
Theories of Energy Security
Senator Richard Lugar, the ranking Republican member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, elaborated six particular energy-related threats to US national security a recent summit on energy strategy: 1. The vulnerability of oil and gas to natural disasters, wars, and terrorist attacks. 2. Increasing expenses due to the growing energy needs of China and India. 3. Energy being used as leverage by rogue petro-states, such as Venezuela and Iran. 4. The tendency of authoritarian regimes with energy resources to ignore international pressure. 5. Increasing global warming resultant from unclean sources of energy. 6. The pressure placed on developing countries by rising energy costs.
The most obvious response to these threats, and the one championed by Lugar himself, is a switch to renewable energy sources leading to energy independence. While such a strategy is intrinsically appealing and environmentally friendly, it cannot resolve all energy-related security issues. Even with massive investments in clean energy research, complete energy independence would not be possible for many years. Moreover, even if the US were to achieve complete energy independence, globalization would ensure that energy crises in Europe or Asia would still render a negative impact on US markets.
Although energy independence would likely decrease the direct costs of purchasing energy for the American public, the production and transportation of goods outside the United States would remain tied to global energy markets. Energy price increases would still exert an impact on the developing world, which in turn would lead to increased demands for US humanitarian assistance. Global warming issues would likewise be left unresolved by energy independence. Without sustained international cooperation, global warming will continue to cause climate changes that result in negative economic consequences.
With pure energy independence clearly not a realistic strategy for achieving legitimate energy security in the short term, one must necessarily consider the more 'traditional' methods of bolstering international security. Some classic theorists, as well as many from the current presidential administration, have expressed support for unilateral, or 'limited multilateral' action of some kind in pursuit of energy security. The idea is that the only defensible arrangement is one between the US and the EU, and that this arrangement can provide a counterweight to Russia and the other emerging petro-states. We contend that this line of thought is equally fallacious.
Generally speaking, both the US and the EU are dependent on foreign sources of energy. Although the most important source of fossil fuels is, of course, the Middle East, the importance of energy from the Black Sea, the Caspian Region, and Central Asia in general is increasing. Given that most of the countries in these regions (with the notable exception of Iran) have demonstrated interest in energy cooperation with the West, some have prescribed a US-EU energy alliance based on Asian energy. The recent work on the Nabucco and BTC pipelines has given credence to this line of thought. Given that these pipelines bypass Russia and Iran completely, why not establish them as the cornerstone of Western security? In the event of a conflict with a resurgent Russia, gas supplies would remain open and Russia's 'petrol leverage' would be neutralized.
The problem with this 'limited multilateral' approach is that neither the US nor the EU can actually guarantee the security of the Nabucco and BTC pipelines. In the event of a US/EU-Russia confrontation, Russia could disrupt the pipelines in at least four different locations. Moreover, if this strategic imbalance in favor of Russia were allowed to persist and intensify, it could fundamentally alter the character of NATO-Russia relations. Russia would have a permanent 'veto' over controversial NATO policies, such as expansion into Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states will become more far more likely to re-enter Russian orbit.
There is one final theory of energy security which must be discussed: develop energy security through cooperation with Russia. Russia has enough energy resources to guarantee energy supplies to the whole of Western Europe for a considerable period of time. Its international clout in the Black Sea and Central Asia, combined with that of the EU, could suffice to create a comprehensive energy structure. Moreover, sustained cooperation with Russia might perhaps mitigate its intransigence on selected issues. While such a policy may have been plausible ten, or perhaps five years ago, it certainly is not today. At present, Russia is the most significant state-level threat to international energy security. Over the past eight years, Russia has perfected the practice of using its energy resources to politically manipulate other countries, particularly the former Soviet republics and (to a lesser extent) Europe.
The Russian government has placed energy policy at the center of its international goals and strategies. In his book Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism, Janusz Bugajski identifies Russia's primary foreign policy goal as restoring itself as a major international player, particularly in the former Soviet areas and other surrounding countries. The first clear instance of Russia leveraging its energy resources in pursuit of these goals came in 1995, when Russian Prime Minister, Chernomyrdin, visited various Eastern European capitals with offers of "lucrative energy and economic deals" in an attempt to dissuade countries from joining NATO. Chernomyrdin's strategy was fooled by what would become a recurring theme in post-Soviet politics: fears of a renewed Russian imperialism.
The attempts to dissuade countries from joining NATO also point to Russia's other main foreign policy goal: limiting Western enlargement in its (former) sphere of influence. To this end, Russia has increasingly been trying to create a situation wherein the EU is almost entirely dependent of Russian energy resources. As Russia's largest energy consumer, there are, in fact, significant sentiments within the EU for a Russian partnership. Increasing the dependence of the EU on Russian oil and gas would improve Russia's overall bargaining position in global politics and would limit the scope of Western enlargement. Two additional goals of the Russian government might also realized by a close partnership with the EU. It might bring Russia closer towards eliminating general US dominance of the international system, and it might help consolidate political dependence in the former Soviet regions.
Russia has already demonstrated it's willingness to use its energy resources as a tool in 'hardball' strategies designed to improve its security positions. An interesting example of this tendency took place in Armenia. In 2006, Armenia and Iran celebrated the opening of a new pipeline between the two states. The completed pipeline, however, was built at only half the originally planned diameter as per a directive from Gazprom (which bought a majority stake in the Armenian section of the project). Gazprom's action here is significant because the original pipeline would have been able to transport gas to beyond Armenia to Western Europe. Although Russia allowed Iran into its market, it was very careful to prevent the possibility of Iranian gas exports to Europe. Russia's aim was to keep Iran out of European markets and instead to redirect it to Asian markets.
Perhaps the clearest example of Russia using hard power in support of its energy objectives is the recent conflict in Georgia. Although Georgia has no significant energy resources of its own, it serves as a vital conduit for oil and gas from Central Asia and the Caspian to the Black Sea and Eastern Europe, at which point it can be made readily available to the rest of the world. The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline runs from the Azerbaijani coast on the Caspian, which is already connected to Turkmenistan's massive energy reserves through preexisting pipelines, through Georgia into Western Turkey. The Nabucco Pipeline, scheduled to come online in 2013, will connect with the BTC Pipeline in Turkey and run through Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary on its way to Austria. Once completed, these two pipelines will constitute the first significant energy line from Central Asia that completely bypasses Russia and Russian client states.
Naturally, the prospect of this pipeline is damaging to Russia's energy strategy, which depends on a near-complete monopoly of energy services to Western Europe. It therefore is reasonable to assume that Russia will try to disrupt the construction and functions of the pipeline before it reaches full capacity. Georgia, and perhaps Central Asia, are the only regions in which Russia could feasibly accomplish this objective. Romania and Bulgaria have strong geographic ties with the West, and Turkey (and, by extension, its close ally Azerbaijan) is too powerful in its own right. Although the literal cause of the August 2008 conflict may have been the separatist issues in South Ossetia, there can be little doubt that Russia's larger objective was enhancing its control of energy supplies running through the Caucasus. Although the issue remains unclear, Russia may have actually targeted the BTC pipeline during the August conflict. One UK newspaper reported that at least 50 Russian missiles had landed in the vicinity of a pipeline vent (the line itself is underground).
Beyond attacking Georgian energy infrastructure itself, the August incursion was meant to demonstrate to the outside world that Russia, in effect, still possesses a 'veto' over the activities of its 'near abroad' states. If and when a legitimate non-Russian pipeline does come online, Russia might very well try to render it unusable with military force. Perhaps more importantly, Russia's recent actions may make other post-Soviet states more reluctant to cooperate with energy projects that bypass Russia. If Russia is willing and able to instigate a conflict in the Caucasus, what is to stop it from doing the same in, say, Central Asia? This strategy may already be working. In late August 2008, Kazakhstan cut off oil to the BTC Pipeline, citing security concerns in Georgia and Turkey, and is now considering diverting the oil into preexisting Russian lines.
The Need for Multilateral Action
Given that the US cannot obtain energy security unilaterally, and energy independence is not a satisfactory option, the US must look to build energy security through sustained and comprehensive multilateral action. An international commitment to energy security would serve a number of purposes. It would create a unified set of energy policies amongst participating countries. International lines of supply based on mutual commitments would also increase the reliability of energy supplies at large. Perhaps most importantly, such an organization would constitute a deterrent against states intent on using energy as a political weapon.
Multilateral action may be the best solution for the problems associated with securing US energy security, but the countries vital to the success of such an action may not readily agree to participate. Once one has accepted that the US cannot resolve its energy security dilemma unilaterally, the next steps are to decide with whom the US should ally and on which geographic regions it will focus. The EU is both the most obvious ally and the easiest to procure. In 2006, the EU and the United States collectively represented 40% of the world's energy consumption and nearly 40% of CO2 emissions. Moreover, the EU's already urgent approach to pursuing energy security makes them a natural partner. The EU views energy as an immediate problem, as it will need an estimated 1 trillion pounds worth of investment for the energy sector over the next twenty years to replace its energy infrastructure to accommodate rising demands.
The EU has already created a strategy for 'sustainable, competitive, and secure energy' that includes items such as completely liberalized gas and electricity markets. Gas is also an important issue within the EU, which is projected to increase gas consumption by 5% in the next thirty years. EU leaders are striving to create a European energy grid and a set of common regulatory standards. They hope to inspire investment in the energy sector and create a system of interconnectedness among the member states.
The EU is a beneficial ally in terms of new technology as well. The EU is known for its focus on alternative energy sources. They hope to fulfill 12% of their energy needs and a fifth of their demand for electricity with renewable sources by 2010. The EU supports twenty eight energy-efficient cities that use green buildings, advanced urban transportation systems, and efficient electricity system management. Research into wind power, solar energy, bioenergy, geothermal energy, biofuels, and hydrogen technologies are taking place throughout Europe. A legitimate energy alliance with the EU has the potential to significantly increase the level of renewable source technology to which the US has access. The EU itself could also be used as a sort of rubric for what works, and what does not work in particular types of urban areas, which could decrease the chance of failure when the US tries implementing new green technology in its own cities. .
The EU, along with the US, must also look incorporate relationships with major energy suppliers and transporters, such as Ukraine, Turkey, the Middle East, and the Caspian Region. These states and regions are all major players in the energy market and must also be addressed in any energy strategy. The Caspian Region, in particular, is both tumultuous and filled with possibilities. The Caspian region includes Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran, and is particularly important because of the massive oil and gas reserves under the sea. There is the potential there for lucrative businesses in both energy transportation and extraction. Unfortunately, significant obstacles stand in the way of both governments and businesses looking to invest in the region. These problems include secessionist movements, weak and authoritarian states, ethnic tensions, Islamic militancy, and a lack of security measures. Bugajski argues that the US must secure this region by westernizing Ukraine and subsequently exporting stability into the Caspian area proper. While it would be convenient to accept that the US has the power to implement such a strategy, in reality only a coalition of countries with vested interests could possess the regional clout and resources implement such a policy.
The Balkans and the Baltic Sea Region are important areas for energy transport. The Balkans include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia. The area is conflict ridden, due in large part to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The Baltic Region produces energy on only a small scale but is strategically located for energy transportation. The region is made up of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and is generally pro-Western and wary of Russian expansion. The Baltic states are members of the EU and NATO, but the US must act as a supportive ally in the region or they will have no choice but to make deals with Russia.
Finally, Central Asia will become a major player in energy politics in the coming years. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan border the Caspian and are poised to transport oil and gas throughout Asia. Currently, Turkmenistan supplies the majority of natural gas that Ukraine imports via Russia. Russia has relied on cheap gas from Turkmenistan to enable it to provide cheaper gas rates to some former USSR countries such as Ukraine. Central Asia's geographical proximity to China guarantees that its strategic importance will grow significantly as global energy needs rise over the next 20 years.
The US needs to establish a presence in these areas as soon as possible to blunt Russia's (and, to a lesser extent, China's) attempts to gain monopolies in the regions. Russia already provides almost half of Europe's natural gas, and when the new Gazprom pipeline under the Baltic Sea is completed that number may reach as high as eighty percent. The countries in the Caspian region are reluctant to rely on a single energy partner, particularly if that partner is Russia, so the opportunity for building a US a presence does exist.
It must be said that the US has been very active in the Caspian Region since the break up of the USSR. The US has had military training programs and border security activities there under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Foreign Military Financing Program. A great deal of money has been spent in the area, about $1.9 billion between 1992 and 1999, under the Freedom Support Act. Support has also not been limited to the public sector; more than thirty American companies have invested billions in the region.
It is evident that the US cannot handle this region alone. The US has notoriously and unsuccessfully tried to keep Iran out of talks with the countries in the Caspian via sanctions. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will continue to look towards Iran, regardless of US objections. America's relationship with Turkey further complicates its position in the region. Turkey is very concerned with alleviating choke points in the Bosporus, and fears that tanker traffic could reach dangerous levels and endanger the population of Istanbul. Turkey was backing, with US support, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to help alleviate this problem, but the shelving of the project has led to additional difficulties.
Perhaps most importantly, any international security regime would have to address Russia with regards to energy policy. Clearly, a strategy of joint action is necessary to mitigate the Russian threat. First and foremost, an energy security collective must find a way to discourage Russian irredentism and expansionism. The governments of Eastern Europe, the Caspian Region, and Central Asia must be supported politically, economically, and perhaps even militarily. One way to accomplish these objectives would be to include the states in preexisting international institutions.
If the US and the EU make such a commitment, however, they must be prepared to follow through on their promises. This point is particularly relevant given the recent developments in Georgia. The US was (and still is) a strong supporter of the Saakishvili government, and devoted considerable funds to modernizing Georgia's military. Georgia itself joined the Bak-Tbilisk-Ceyhan oil pipeline that would bypass Russia to transport Caspian Sea oil to world markets. The August 2008 Russian incursion, however, revealed the lack of depth to US support. The US could not, prior to the conflict, invest sufficient military resources in the region to deter Russian aggression, and, once the war began, was rendered essentially powerless. Russia knew that the US would not risk igniting a wider conflict in the region, leading it to operate with relative impunity in Georgia. If the US and the EU do decide to include states from Russia's 'near abroad' in an energy alliance, then they must be prepared to create a credible 'hard power' deterrent in each of these states against Russian interference.
Related to the Georgian crisis, Bugajski stressed the need for the US to commit to ensuring security throughout Europe on a whole. Neglecting to do this may actually encourage Russia to be more aggressive in its pressure on Eastern Europe. The US must demonstrate its commitment with action, not rhetoric. Throughout its history, The US has been known for making security guarantees with smaller states that it has no intention or ability to fulfill. The US's handling of the Georgia crisis may have already demonstrated to other post-Soviet states that this reputation remains couched in fact. Given that this new political environment has made it significantly harder for the current administration to convince Eastern European and Central Asian states that they have our support, a new energy security system must recognize these countries as equal partners. A first step would be to include the remaining Balkan states in NATO. These include Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.
A new energy security regime must also work to directly mitigate Russian energy dominance. Outside of the standard idea of alternative supplies, a primary goal must be creating pipelines that transport Caspian Sea oil to Europe without traveling through Russia. Several East European states are poised to accommodate the expansion of supply going through their borders. Disregarding some public comments from Eastern European leaders, most of these states are eager to reap the political and economic advantages of these alternative pipelines. The first key, however, will be ensuring these states' basic security needs against any possible Russian response to new pipelines. These second will be preventing Russia from gaining any sort of monopoly on gas transport from the Caspian Region before the pipelines are complete.
Energy Security through the IEA?
An international energy market and international energy alliances may be unavoidable. In "Ensuring Energy Security," Daniel Yergin argues that the coordination of developed countries in this international system is, in fact, the key to preventing a crisis of supply disruption. This particular benefit of international coordination was actually validated in 2005 by the International Energy Agency's (IEA) response to Hurricane Katrina. In a press release issued on September 2, 2005, the IEA announced that it would release two million barrels of oil a day of emergency stocks for at least thirty days to counteract the disruption in oil supplies caused by the damage to oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico. This release of supplies was both an act of 'solidarity' and a means to restore confidence in the international market. It is because the US was (and still is) a member of the IEA that there was such a rapid response to the energy disruption. Moreover, is only because of the IEA that the necessary energy reserves existed at all. An agreement within the IEA requires that all member states hold oil stocks equivalent to at least ninety days of net oil imports. The obvious effectiveness of the IEA in this case begs the question: could the IEA function as the US's energy security mechanism, in lieu of creating an entirely new organization?
While this line of though is indeed tempting, we do not believe the IEA to be capable of ensuring international energy security in its present form. The IEA maintains a focus on informal negotiations to persuade governments and energy companies to act in responsible manners. Like many international organizations, it is designed to limit what its member states can do. The IEA requires its members to perform specific actions pertaining to energy reserves and price setting, and also facilitates negotiations between countries while serving as a link between industry and government on a global scale. As is a problem in many other organizations, though, the IEA lacks enforcement powers and it is not designed to implement pre-established rules. It is far more effective in emergency situations than in its general day-to-day operations.
Throughout its history, the IEA has championed various innovative policies, but its lack of enforcement authority has made them far less effective then they could be if the organization had a more legitimate mandate. In 1979, for example, the IEA attempted to implement a 'demand restraint policy' that would have set energy import targets for each member country. There was no legal obligation to meet these targets; rather the IEA depended on international pressure to ensure compliance. The result was that the policy became a symbolic measure that was, in practice, largely ignored by the member states. In fact, the targets themselves reflected their creators' assumption that no one would follow them. For example, the 1980 target was set 70% higher than the level of imports for 1978. The idea behind setting these targets was that merely discussing demand restraint, albeit in an unrealistic fashion, would inspire real discussion about possible structural changes. The IEA also hoped to raise awareness about energy problems and provoke debate within the individual countries themselves. While the IEA has historically been effective in dealing with emergencies and promoting general discussion of global energy policy, it is not properly equipped to deal with the energy crisis currently looming over its member states. If it is to be effective, the IEA needs the legitimacy and authority to enforce it's agreed upon rules.
The Energy Security Regime
We believe the only way to truly ensure energy security is through the reorganization of the IEA to form a legitimate 'energy security regime' encompassing the US, the EU, and energy producing and transporting countries in Eastern Europe and near Asia. By 'security regime,' we refer to a binding alliance designed to guarantee the safety and security of energy supplies, to allow inexpensive sharing of ideas and technology, to build a group of states with leverage to counteract oil and gas cartels, and to prevent other states from manipulating energy sources for dangerous political gains.
An alliance would constitute an entity with enough power and leverage to overcome Europe's lack of sufficient indigenous energy sources. At present, Russia can exert substantial pressure on Eastern European states because of its relative dominance of the gas market. If these countries were enveloped into the Western fold via an energy security alliance, then they would be able to alleviate Russian pressure with a legitimate deterrent. A stable energy agreement in Eastern Europe would result in a stable energy environment throughout Europe, and would directly and indirectly benefit all members.
The creation of any new organization entails a tremendous amount of uncertainty on the part of its creators, due to a lack of both knowledge and trust. Reducing this uncertainty is both expensive and time consuming, and can only be alleviated through the dissemination of scientific, cultural, and political information about the problem and all the states involved. High levels of trial and error are inevitable. This sort of drawn out process is not beneficial to the US, which has to prove, relatively quickly that it is in the interest of the post-Soviet states to ally directly with the West, as opposed to Russia. .
Therefore, we conclude that expanding and reinforcing the IEA, rather than creating an entirely new organization, is the best option for minimizing these organizational obstacles. The IEA already possesses an expansive knowledge base on energy crises and the energy market in general. The repeated interactions that have already occurred between the members of the IEA have already created a sense of trust and community. The IEA's response to Hurricane Katrina proves that IEA states do fulfill their obligations.
Although the current iteration of the IEA constitutes a solid base for a legitimate security organization, significant changes must be made. An effective energy regime necessitates a broader membership pool. The current members of the IEA are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US. While many of these countries already play important roles in the production and transportation of energy, there is no representation of the most strategically important energy producer and transporter states: those in Eastern Europe and the Caspian Region. An alliance that does not incorporate these areas will not possess leverage or bargaining power to effectively negotiate with Russia and other energy producing states. As time goes on, these countries will consolidate control over their energy resources, making it is essential that we secure their cooperation now. Waiting will only compound our disadvantage; if we wait too long, Russia may obtain so much influence over these states that cooperation will become unfeasible.
One central problem with expanding membership in this manner would be that doing so would negate much of the trust that already exists among the IEA states.
The original members would have no experiences upon which to place trust in the new members. One potential solution for this problem would be to look outside the IEA for previous examples of cooperation between the current IEA states and those we would seek to incorporate into a new security apparatus. This sort of cooperation is most evident in NATO. Of the twenty-six IEA countries, seventeen are also members of NATO. Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are full NATO members, and Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have participated in selected NATO activities as 'peace partners.'
We therefore propose to limit the expansion of IEA membership to NATO members and states with 'partner in peace' status. The IEA could retain other criteria for membership, but states leaning towards NATO ideals and Western partnerships would be explicitly advantaged. Requiring that new IEA states have had some involvement with NATO gives them instant credibility with the US and Western Europe as viable allies. This reformed organization would be, at its core, an security alliance, making mutual trust between member states absolutely necessary.
Beyond expanding membership, the three main issues that would have to be tackled by this reformed IEA are: establishing authority, monitoring, and providing enforcement. The reformed IEA must demand action and possess the ability to sanction rogue members. Since this new organization is, at its core, an alliance, it must be able to command a unified response to any outside attack, be it political, economic, or military, against the energy infrastructure of a member state. Vested authority alone cannot guarantee such compliance if the organization has no means of monitoring or enforcing these mandates. Instead, this new IEA must independently possess the ability to identify and sanction noncompliant states.
The established rules must be clear and understood by all member states. They can be enforced by a number of different strategies, and in fact, should not be safeguarded on merely one level. Enforcement can be accomplished through hired agents, by those in the new IEA, by agents of the particular states, or even by those at lower local levels. A system of mutual monitoring must be implemented. Such a 'soft' system is made feasible by the fact that states will want to maintain an image of reliability in the international circle so that future alliances will be available to them. This may especially true for Eastern European and Caspian countries, which have historically had difficulty establishing and maintaining effective alliances. Ideally, each state should create its own local organization to monitor and implement the agreed upon terms. Contributions from the group, as a whole, could then be made available to those states that cannot afford to fund the establishment of such an agency or the continued costs of monitoring and enforcement. In an effort to ensure compliance, there should be supplementary agents from the new energy regime that periodically inspect the energy infrastructure within each member state.
Rules and usage policies for this new organization should be created through open debates that take into account the interests of every member state and do not exclude interested states from initial membership. Ostrom views these rules as inherently connected to local conditions, "Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labor, materials, and/or money". The success of this energy regime may thus be dependent on the development of multifaceted policies that reflect the situation of individual members. It is particularly important, in this case, to ensure equal representation, given that the most politically 'weak' member states would in fact be the states controlling the resource upon which the alliance is based. The US most carefully limit its influence over the specific policies adopted by the organization. Although the US may necessarily provide much of the military weight behind the alliance, EU states will provide much of the technological expertise necessary for energy security, and the Asian states will offer natural resources and their strategically important locations.
To this end, we advocate endowing each member state with one vote, with decisions being made by simple majority rule. The head of the organization could perhaps rotate every four years, giving the opportunity for each region to lead the alliance's executive functions. The actual decisions pertaining to the organization's structure will need to be discussed and made by the member states themselves; with equal representation stressed in pursuit of the most substantial results.
Although the institutional structure of this organization is important, we must also consider the specific policy items that this energy regime with pursue. Consider Senator Luger's threats to energy security. The contemporary IEA is already equipped to address Lugar's first threat, 'the vulnerability of oil and gas to natural disasters, wars, and terrorist attacks.' The reserve system has proven effective and should be maintained. In addition, the organization should possess an action plan detailing its collective response in the event of an attack on the energy infrastructure of a member state. A guaranteed collective response will both deter outside actors from launching attacks, and ensure stability in the event of a crisis.
This new energy organization will also need to establish conservationism as one of its central tenets, and actively promote research into energy alternatives and conservation measures. Such a commitment may seem prohibitively expensive and politically unwieldy for the Caspian petro-states, but its future benefits will likely outweigh the costs. If the US and the EU can significantly reduce their energy footprints,
China and India's growing energy needs will have a smaller impact on the global energy market. A focus on renewables will additionally help combat global warming. Finally, by providing energy saving technology to low income states, the organization will help manage threat of rising energy costs draining the income of developing countries (and inhibiting global economic growth).
Myriad other threats will also be greatly reduced, provided that the organization can remain unified. The alliance's global clout and resources should mitigate the leverage held by large energy-producing states. The group, as a whole, would have a superior bargaining position during political and economic negotiations than its members would independently. This energy alliance will also help refine and focus international pressure on authoritarian petro-states which, coupled with the potential lower price of oil and gas from conservation efforts, could lead to democratic gains throughout the world.
Conclusions
Energy security is critical for the United States. The continuous, unmitigated presence of threats to energy security will lead to economic, political, and military repercussions. Energy security is clearly a necessity, but it is not possible for the US to secure it unilaterally. Neither the US nor the EU possesses the capability to secure sufficient energy resources abroad. Even working in concert, the US and EU would face significant challenges. Russia has made it clear that they desire energy dominance in Europe and Central Asia, and is working aggressively to achieve it. Moreover, Russia has overtly manipulated supply and prices to suit their political needs, and is willing to use military force in pursuit of political objectives.
Given that energy is an international public good, the only solution lies in collective action. States need to be mutually coerced into providing energy security, but once it is created it will lead to greater stability in the energy market as a whole. The best option is the establishment of an energy security regime; that is, a hybrid between an alliance and a traditional bureaucratic organization. This organization should be based on the IEA, a successful energy organization that is presently too narrow in scope. This new entity will provide reserves in the event of a disaster, will increase the security of the existing energy infrastructure, and will combat the growing dominance of powerful energy producing states.
This energy regime will include states that have previously been excluded from other international organizations. Eastern Europe and Central Asia, although historically known for their instability, must be included to ensure energy security. In the past, guaranteeing support for these regions has been impossible; it is only with a collective alliance that such an action would be feasible. In addition, the energy regime will grant these and other less developed nation states access to energy-saving technology. The US must act quickly to garner support for this energy regime before Russia permanently incorporates Central Asian states into its sphere. The US should initiate collective action immediately, for the sake of supply and access for the general international market. The US needs energy security, and can only build it through decisive and comprehensive multilateral action.
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